Saeima of the Republic of Latvia

Interviewer.

After 4 May was the Putsch inevitable? Was there something in the air? Was there any prior information?

T. Jundzis.

Yes. I think, it can be said that the Putsch was inevitable, and it was a logical consequence. That is because, if we recall the Barricades of 1991, the Barricades in January prevented achievement of goals that were set by those who wanted to restore the totalitarian regime, the Soviet regime. In fact, the Putsch did not resolve anything; everything remained as it was before. Furthermore, when Mikhail Gorbachev eagerly promoted the New Soviet Treaty, which, of course, was intended to include the Baltic States and which stated that there would be a democratic Soviet Union, and when it was evident that the Baltic States, as reflected also in referenda, were completely against the Treaty, those who were afraid to lose their offices – the nomenklatura [people who were appointed to offices in government or economic administration by the organs of the Communist Party] – understood that Gorbachev would not be the flag bearer and that everything could be lost... the nomenklatura. Therefore, they had to respond somehow. And, of course, the Putsch was their response to that.

There was prior information about the Putsch. By the way, it was publicly available. Imagine that in June 1991, Ilmārs Bišers, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, Deputy of Ivars Godmanis [Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia], publicly said at a meeting of the Popular Front faction in the Supreme Council that during the summer recess of the Supreme Council of the USSR, a coup could be expected, namely, a coup in Moscow and the Soviet Union; his statement was published in several newspapers later in June. He warned about that.

Of course, he didn’t have any documents… that’s clear… and no one paid particular attention to his warning.

With regard to the Supreme Council… Back then I was the Chairman of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia had succeeded in adopting the resolution by on the Establishment of the Centre for Non-Violent Resistance. The Centre was established in summer, in July, and it was supposed to be a centre that would organise non-violent resistance in case of a coup or if an attempt was made to restore the Soviet rule. Unfortunately, the Centre did not have any support or funding. The Centre… it was not well developed by the time of the Putsch. Thus it can be said that we were completely unprepared for the Putsch. We were drafting a resolution On the Emergency Situation. Actually the draft resolution was fairly good; however, by the time of the Putsch… By the way, we were working on it during the Putsch, but it was not adopted.

We had also started to draft the Law on the National Guard… already in the summer. It was not adopted by the time of the Putsch either. In other words, to a certain extent, we were… Maybe, if we think about mistakes, then, on the one hand, it was a mistake that we did not get ready for such an event properly; but on the other hand, maybe those who said that we should not provoke the Soviet Union – not to do anything provocative, not to station border guards on the frontiers, not to establish customs, and eventually not to erect barricades – were right. Those who supported independence also had diverse views. Of course, they were right to a certain extent. But… thank God, it all ended the way it did.

Interviewer.

So, in your opinion, Gorbachev was the good guy at that time?

T. Jundzis.

During the Putsch?

Interviewer.

Yes. He wasn’t involved in organising the Putsch, was he?

T. Jundzis.

You know, there are several versions. I have not studied this matter in detail. I think… I am more inclined to think that he was not, that he was not among the organisers… However, who knows? Maybe one day some documents will be found. But I think that he was a good guy and that it was done behind his back. Furthermore, we should take into account his slight naïveté, his slight enthusiasm for democracy and the fact that he really believed that he would be able to put his country’s democracy in order.

Several sources reveal that already in the summer of 1991 or even earlier he had given up the dream of seeing the Baltic States as a part of this Union of Sovereign States. He probably thought that they would politically play on the situation and that the Baltic States would… Say, since we cannot keep them under control, let’s leave them alone and God will punish them; let’s create a union consisting of nine republics. It’s highly likely that Gorbachev had resigned himself to that. So from that perspective as well... There is a great deal of evidence that in March 1991, after referenda were held here in Latvia and the other Baltic States, he made such a decision for himself; there is evidence of that. That could be considered evidence that Gorbachev was not among the organisers of the Putsch.

Interviewer.

How did you find out about the Putsch and how did you feel?

T. Jundzis.

Well, in comparison to January... It was very simple. I was at my flat in Riga when at... yes, I think one of my colleagues from the Supreme Council called and told me to switch on the radio or television, where it was announced that there was Putsch in Moscow. Like that... The morning of 19 August was sunny; the sun was shining, a real Indian summer. In the beginning it was... the Putsch in Moscow, OK... Of course, there was an uneasy feeling.

Then, of course, we started to analyse what was happening and understood that it was... we realised rather quickly that the situation was extremely serious. Think about it – I found out about the Putsch at 7.30 a.m., and already at 10 o’clock there was a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia. The entire Presidium was seated around a big table. Back then the Presidium had certain significant power; sometimes it adopted decisions together with the government. And actually it was interesting how we – members of the Presidium – led by Gorbunovs [Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia], gathered there… As always, everyone was looking at the Chairman... what will he say? Our Chairman was well known for his flexible stance on very complicated and controversial matters. Honestly, I was expecting him to say that, on the one hand, the Putsch is bad but, on the other hand, we have to take it into account. But this time there was no hesitation. Uncharacteristically, Anatolijs Gorbunovs opened the Presidium meeting that was also attended by Ivars Godmanis, head of the government, and said: “This Putsch is unlawful,” and something like: “By no means can we support it; we have to be unequivocal.” And thus we were the first... I have written in my books that we were the first among world’s legislators… the Presidium was to a certain extent a legislative body… we were the first to adopt a resolution which clearly condemned the Putsch in Moscow. In a way, we were the first in the world...

Two hours later the sitting of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia began and this resolution was adopted.

Interviewer.

Was there any individual or collective fear, namely, the feeling of lives being in danger?

T. Jundzis.

Let’s compare it to January. Then there was simply no time to think about it. That’s what can be primarily said about the life-threatening feeling. Second, [in January] we were all together – sometimes sleeping in offices under our tables or being in the streets – we were among our own people at all times.

During the Putsch, the feeling was different because actually to a certain extent we were alone – the Supreme Council, members of the Supreme Council… everyone was on his own somewhere... and yes, in contrast to January, fear did set in. Yes, it was like that. Because we understood that there would be no fooling around and that we would not be allowed to follow the same scenario as in January. It seemed that we, at least my colleagues and I, understood that right away. That is also the answer to the question why we did not erect any barricades.

Maybe not everybody knows that the first thing the Soviet army did on 19 August was to block all bridges starting with the Jugla Bridge. There were armoured personnel carriers. No motorcades could get into Riga anymore. Therefore, speculations on why we did not erect barricades in August are irrelevant.

Interviewer.

What would have been your decision if the Putsch had succeeded – to emigrate or to do something else?

T. Jundzis.

It seems that most probably... Just as the rest of us, I have not had a chance to see those documents, but allegedly there were lists of those who were supposed to be incarcerated or who were to be subjected to even more severe punishment. Allegedly there have been such lists. In that case, there wouldn’t have been much choice. But if there had been a choice, of course, I would have hidden in woods at first… Of course, it also depends for how long because those were not the 1940’s, and we were smart enough to understand that such guerrilla warfare was impossible. But definitely I would have remained a fugitive. Once more I emphasise – at least psychologically we had been preparing for this non-violent struggle for years. There were instructions devised by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia and its Defence and Internal Affairs Committee on what and how... They were based on the document drafted by the Latvian Popular Front regarding action in an emergency situation. It would be a non-violent resistance… Everybody was prepared, yes... But I think that activists undoubtedly would have…

Interviewer.

I doubt it would have been possible to have an entirely non-violent...

T. Jundzis.

Of course... there would be military opposition as well.

Interviewer.

To what extent did the response of the Baltic States or of some other territorial units to the Putsch influence its failure in Moscow?

T. Jundzis.

You mean Western countries?

Interviewer.

Yes, Western countries as well, but mainly those within the Soviet Union... the response of former member states? Or was it more, let’s say, the outcome of relations between Jeltsin and the Kremlin?

T. Jundzis.

No... I don’t believe such unfounded conspiracy theories... I think that the putschists were simply... First, they were fearful, because those who led the Putsch were people from the inner circle of the Soviet bureaucracy...

Interviewer.

But there were people from the highest ranking Soviet institutions as well... military leaders, KGB, and....

T. Jundzis.

Exactly... That’s what I meant... Because lives and careers of Soviet civil servants, starting from these highest ranking institutions, had one common peculiarity and characteristic – fear to lose their offices. And thus they were afraid of every, let’s say, leaf that fell off somewhere nearby... They were afraid; they had to respond immediately somehow because maybe there was an enemy behind it... And, God forbid if there was a group of five or more people assembling somewhere, or, even worse, if some kind of statement was being distributed... They were irrationally afraid of everything that was happening. The entire Soviet Union was based on the response to everything... Response in the wrong direction... And although they took this step to save their careers, at the same time they were afraid. And when they didn’t receive any support, when the army started to hesitate, when Latvia and afterwards other former Soviet republics started to announce, one by one, that they did not support the Putsch... They simply got scared. They got scared... And, of course, frankly speaking, they got scared also of the fact that if bloodshed began and if it were even greater than in Moscow, they would later have to face the Western countries without which it would be hard to rule the country in the new circumstances.

Interviewer.

It means that the proclamation of independence and adoption of the Constitutional Law did not have merely symbolic value?

T. Jundzis.

I think that it was one of the most farsighted strategic decisions made during the entire period of the Awakening since 1988. Regarding the Constitutional Law of 21 August 1991... legally it was very weak. Very weak. I am even slightly ashamed of it...

Interviewer.

Why?

T. Jundzis.

Well… it… with good intentions abolished all Soviet laws, including the criminal code. We had no grounds to put on trial anyone starting from that very day. Can you imagine that? No one had any criminal liability... Afterwards the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia tried to patch something up and… Maybe that was the main... irony...

But politically it was truly excellent. Honestly, I, who was very closely involved in these processes, admire the people who thought of it... In such a situation, when people think about where they will be tomorrow – in jail, in the woods or somewhere else... to think of such a resolution! And my research has led me... Initially, I thought that Estonians had devised such document first because Estonia adopted it a day earlier... late in the evening... or even at night on 20 August... and that we had borrowed it from the Estonians. But in reality the documents prove that the Board or another part of the Latvian National Independence Movement had already prepared such a decision during the day on 20 [August]... And actually, it was not merely a decision; a written text had been sent and an appeal had been published... Can you imagine that? On 20 August... that we should proclaim de facto independence and end the transition period! So it is a unique decision, and I truly admire those who initiated it.

There are two documents. The second is the no less important document on action in case of emergency, which was drafted and adopted under the leadership of the Latvian Popular Front in December 1990. These are unique good documents.