Saeima of the Republic of Latvia

J. Bojārs.

The August Putsch was predictable.

Interviewer.

How did you find out about the Putsch?

J. Bojārs.

For me, to be honest, the August Putsch began unexpectedly and rather stupidly. I had taken my wife for a week or three days – I’m not sure for how long – to see Uppsala, where I had been a trainee; I had friends there... I had taken my wife on that damn ship. And when we returned, – wham! – the Putsch! One morning we woke up, turned on the TV, and Swan Lake was on – tram-tam-tam-tam! We were really in a mess! So we waited for a while and understood what mess we were in. It was clear that the situation was much more serious because they would definitely use force. But we were saved by the fact that at that moment the Russian soldiers balked at the idea of shooting at Russians. At that point, the plans of those reactionaries fell through because, actually, if you consider the whole enormous empire, how many people could there be in the streets of Moscow with its population of 10 million?

The Putsch failed because of its inept organisation and its unskilled leaders. It fell through due to stupidity and the power struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Absolutely foolishly it was announced that Gorbachev had fallen ill in Crimea, although he wasn’t ill at all. Well, it was because of the inept and stupid organisation of the Putsch and Yeltsin’s convincing actions. He was a man of action, not a philosopher. He was a man of few words, but he acted vigorously. He had been an athlete in his youth, tall and strong. He had great authority in Russia. Basically, the struggle between these two people for power in the empire is what destroyed the USSR. Yeltsin succeeded convincingly. He got rid of Gorbachev with a single wave of the hand. Gorbachev had come to the sitting of the Supreme Council of Russia; Yeltsin shoved a piece of paper under his nose and said: “Read this, please!” Gorbachev glanced at it but didn’t read it. So it was something... I think it was something that revealed that Gorbachev was behind the Putsch. What did all those Putsch leaders – General Yazov [Minister for Defence and Marshal of the Soviet Union] and Kryuchkov [Chairman of the KGB of the USSR] – who were arrested testify afterwards? They said: “But Gorbachev knew it all! He was the one who said: ‘Well, guys, go ahead! But if you fail, I’ll have nothing to do with it.’”

Well, that saved us. Otherwise, it would be naive to think that Westerners would use force to assist us. Certainly not! I think they would not get themselves involved in a military conflict with the USSR under any circumstances. And when all the shops in the great empire were empty and there was nothing to eat, it was clear that previously applied methods were useless.

Interviewer.

What was the mood at the Supreme Council when you went there on 19 August? When the armoured personnel carriers were on the bridges, and everyone understood that anything could happen?

J. Bojārs.

Well, to tell the truth, I requested weapons so that we could at least die with honour. They could certainly use their weapons against us. There was no doubt about that! If they were shooting at the Supreme Council of Russia, why wouldn’t they shoot at us as well?! At least then I would be... I was a good shot, really. I’ve been a hunter my entire life, ever since I was a child. If only I could have smuggled my sniper gun, the long Browning, inside, then I would have cleared those armoured personnel carriers of some of the OMON troops. Believe me! If they had let me, I would have shot some of them down.

Interviewer.

All right. That was your mood. What was the mood of the others?

J. Bojārs.

Well, not everybody can handle weapons, and I think the majority couldn’t. And the situation was rather... Well, I don’t want to point at anyone and... but one member of the Supreme Council tore up his Supreme Council identification card – well, there were some nervous people there – and left. “I’m not coming back to this atmosphere!” There were different situations, and behind the official scene, so to speak, a few people were prostrated, even some of those who were in charge. I believe some of you remember what I am talking about; so does God. Everyone has his or her own ideology. But if they had shot at me, I wouldn’t have liked it at all; I would have taken offence. But they didn’t give us [weapons]!

We were being guarded at that time by two short, bald policemen. And only when the Putsch was in full force, only then the policemen from Bauska came to guard us. And those were very serious Latvians! They were also prepared – if necessary, they would... And then only Vectirāns’ [Commander of the 1^st Police Battalion the Republic of Latvia] guys returned, took over the guard posts... Actually they didn’t return – they hadn’t been there earlier – they simply took over. And that was much more serious.

Interviewer.

What were you doing when the Putsch began? Your memories and feelings are very important to us.

J. Bojārs.

I was in Riga at that time, and it was actually clear to us that our method, namely, running to Moscow right away, would be useless because Moscow was still in the hands of the putschists at that moment. But they had it in their hands for only two days, and then Yeltsin came to power. Then we, our team, rushed to Moscow again; although Krastiņš [member of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia] had made it impossible to visit Moscow, we understood that we had to do one thing – put an end to the USSR once and for all. Gorbachev’s first vote on putting an end to the USSR failed, and another one was required to have enough votes to dissolve the Congress. The dissolution of the Congress would mean the disappearance of the USSR. And it was good that we voted for it, although the team of Krastiņš, all the other members of the LNNK [Latvian National Independence Movement], said that we had nothing to do over there. I don’t know if that would have been the right thing to do! So – in a democratic way – the USSR ceased to exist for good.

Interviewer.

Did the Latvian constitutional resolution of 21 August sever the de iure ties with the USSR?

J. Bojārs.

Yes, in legal terms it did. I believe that the document prepared by Krastiņš (Krastiņš prepared it)... it was very short and concise; nothing more was needed. It’s just that Krastiņš was not the person who could produce something longer and more coherent. But what he had written was correct, timely and adequate for the relevant circumstances. With that we put an end to the Soviet era. Although there were certain death throes till the Soviet... till the Russian army left completely. While their military forces were still here, it was not safe.

Interviewer.

Did the putschists have at least a minimal chance to win?

J. Bojārs.

Where, in Latvia?

Interviewer.

In Latvia.

J. Bojārs.

Technically – yes. There were plenty of military bases. Plenty of them! They could have blocked all the motorways; moreover, they had the necessary military training. Driving to Dobele district, I always had to cross numerous bridges, and I knew; I had seen them having military training sessions for placing armoured personnel carriers on the bridges. Therefore, they... they were more or less prepared for a second coup. They didn’t have enough courage; they were waiting for the outcome in Moscow.

Interviewer.

The order was not given, was it?

J. Bojārs.

Apparently, the order to escalate the violence, to escalate it to a certain extent, was not given since no military man would start firing heavy weapons in the city at his own discretion. Or, for instance, we were also told that there was... Well, there was this rumour that the man in charge of those crocodiles, those military helicopters, that he had... basically he had a backup team. So he had already been told that he would have to wipe out the Supreme Council if necessary. That was the easiest option – to shoot missiles at the Supreme Council in a densely populated city, moreover, in the Old Town; and only an empty space would remain! But, apparently, the commander had refused. That’s how the rumour goes. I don’t know whether it is true that he refused to do it. I simply do not know.

Interviewer.

What would you have done if the Putsch had succeeded? Would you have emigrated or stayed here?

J. Bojārs.

You make it sound so simple – emigrate! Under circumstances when they were guarding the borders...

Interviewer.

But let’s say they had won and made you an offer: “Get out of here!”

J. Bojārs.

Well, then it would have been the only option. I had a wife and children, so... That would have been the easiest way. I think that... Well, another thing was that they actually had orders telling them whom to detain, along with their families. We were told, according to Moscow, that there would be such a thing... that they would have a list of people to be arrested with their families and killed. Somehow, strangely enough we... we didn’t see the papers seized from the Central Committee. Documents of the Central Committee were being burned. Rubiks [member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia, Chairman of the State Committee for Emergency Situations] was there, and I think that back in those days Rubiks was close to a nervous breakdown. Well, now he represents Latvia in Europe. Some kind of democracy, a model democracy!

So, the situation back then was extremely serious.