Jānis Vagris |
Interviewer. The Putsch took place on 19 August; the weather was hot and sunny. How did you get to know about it? Did you have some knowledge of it beforehand?
J. Vagris. Well, I learned about it just like everybody else – from the television when they broadcast the “Dance of the Little Swans”.
Interviewer. Where were you at that time – in Riga or Moscow?
J. Vagris. I was in Riga. At that time we were constantly commuting between Riga and Moscow; the flights and everything were free... On Mondays, I mean on Sunday evenings, we used to go to Moscow and on Friday evenings back to Riga.
Interviewer. Back to Riga, right.
J. Vagris. And then the Putsch began... I believe, it was Sunday, wasn’t it?
Interviewer. I believe so.
J. Vagris. Well, I was in Riga.
Interviewer. So you were watching television...
J. Vagris. So I saw what was going, and, obviously, on that Sunday I skipped my trip to Moscow. Monday came, and I was pondering what to do. I called Gorbunovs [Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia], and this is what I said: “Anatolijs, what should I do? There’s a huge mess over there – should I stay or should I go? Should I just stay here?” And he said: “You know, there’s a helicopter circling above my head as well. You have to decide on your own... Actually, it would be a good idea...” On Monday morning I received a telegram from the government (this is why I called him) which said that on Tuesday the Presidium meeting was going to be held; I am talking about the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR. And I said: “Should I go to the meeting?” “Well,” he replied, “it wouldn’t do us any harm; at least we will get some information about what is going on.” All right, then. On Tuesday morning I got on the plane, and off I went to Moscow. So I arrived in Moscow; the meeting was scheduled sometime around noon or in the afternoon... I called the Kremlin because the telegram said that the participants have to confirm their arrival.
Interviewer. I see.
J. Vagris. Previously, there was no such procedure. But this time it said: “Confirm your arrival” by calling such and such a telephone number. So I called that number and said: “I hereby confirm my arrival.” I stayed at the embassy residence. And then they said something that I had never heard from them before: “All right, then, but do not use public transportation. There are traffic jams on the streets and such.” Usually I simply walked to the nearby underground station and went to the city centre. But that time they said: “Don’t do that! You are entitled to a car. Call for a car!” Well, I called the car fleet office. And I was driven to the Kremlin... The Supreme Council’s fleet used to be admitted to the Kremlin without any questions asked because they had those special number plates... But this time we were stopped for a document check. So I showed them my ID badge. “You are free to go!” So we drove through the gates, and I saw that the whole garden was crowded with armoured personnel carriers.
Interviewer. You hadn’t seen anything like that before?
J. Vagris. Usually the garden was empty, except for the Tsar Cannon that was placed there. And all of a sudden the garden was full of armoured personnel carriers.
Interviewer. How did you feel about that?
J. Vagris. I was thinking: “Well, they let me in, but will they let me out? You never know.” So, Lukyanov [Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR] was chairing the Presidium meeting, for Gorbachev had been arrested, I mean detained... the situation at that time was very unclear. Tension was quite high at the meeting. The Russian opposition claimed that Lukyanov had visited Gorbachev and had spoken with him, but he denied that ... In the end, it turned out that he actually had flown to Foros and...
Interviewer. So Lukyanov had flown there during the Putsch?
J. Vagris. It was before. Before the Putsch.
Interviewer. I see.
J. Vagris. Yes, before the Putsch.
Interviewer. But he did not go with all the putschists, did he? Did the putschists go separately?
J. Vagris. No, no, the putschists went separately. He had been there and had made some kind of arrangement with Gorbachev...
Interviewer. Does that mean he had seen the poor, sick Gorbachev, a man on his deathbed as they said...?
J. Vagris. It was not the main topic of discussion. They focused mainly on the need to bring Gorbachev in so that he could explain what was going on.
Interviewer. Is this what Lukyanov said?
J. Vagris. No, no, it was the opposition.
Interviewer. So the Presidium meeting consisted of Lukyanov and representatives from each republic?
J. Vagris. Yes, from all the republics. It was the so-called open and enlarged meeting.
Interviewer. I see, so it could be attended even by...
J. Vagris. Yes. But there was no one else except those from Moscow.
Interviewer. Was there anybody else from Latvia besides you?
J. Vagris. No, just me. And at that time there were already some casualties here and there... And I took the floor and said: “We have to restrain the defence and law enforcement agencies somehow. We already have casualties.” At that time there really were people who had lost their lives.
Interviewer. What date are you talking about? 20 August?
J. Vagris. It was Tuesday. Yes, either 20 or 21 August.
Interviewer. But on 21 August everything went downhill.
J. Vagris. Well, then it must have been 20 August. We should check the calendar to be precise.
Interviewer. I want to ask you the following question... Usually, if there is a coup, it is only logical that the parliament is the first to react, isn’t that so? An extraordinary Supreme Council meeting has to be convened; at least it would be logical... But it seems that no one even bothered to raise this issue during the Putsch...
J. Vagris. They did!
Interviewer. Did they?
J. Vagris. Actually, yes. They argued that it was necessary to call an extraordinary meeting, for Article 6 had already been deleted.
Interviewer. True, it had been deleted by then.
J. Vagris. But Lukyanov said no. He said no; we have to clarify the situation and only then... Regarding the defence and law enforcement agencies, he swore by all that is holy that no one had received such orders. I don’t know why, but, for instance, Pugo [Minister for the Interior of the USSR] did not participate in the Presidium meeting. Neither Kryuchkov [Chairman of the KGB] nor Pugo was there. So they talked and talked about it; they said that some kind of instructions will be given... But they emphasised the need to do whatever is necessary to avoid aggravating the situation.
Interviewer. So this was the main conclusion of the meeting?
J. Vagris. It’s hardly a conclusion. Afterwards Lukyanov said: “All right! At this point our hands are tied; we have insufficient information to make any decisions. Let’s take a recess and continue with the meeting tomorrow.” And that’s it. On the following day, the meeting was cancelled, and that is how it all ended. Well, and then I thought: “God knows, before I get to the embassy, I must inform Peters [member of the Supreme Council of the USSR from Latvia and poet] somehow.” I tried the telephone, but communications had been cut off.
Interviewer. Communications were cut off in the Kremlin?
J. Vagris. Yes, all phones at the Kremlin were dead.
Interviewer. That’s strange. You at the Kremlin were supposed to be the supreme power.
J. Vagris. Not exactly. In the Kremlin the phones were still operational, but at the receiving end, for instance, at our embassy, the lines were disconnected. So the phones were not completely dead, but some of the lines... certain numbers were cut off. Completely dead.
Interviewer. So you tried to call Peters without any success?
J. Vagris. No success at all! The operator simply said: “The number is not available” or: “The number cannot be reached.” They had these special internal “Kremlin lines”... There was a back-up communication line in the Kremlin...
Interviewer. The so-called HF [high frequency] telephone lines...
J. Vagris. Exactly, but there were HF lines that covered only Moscow and also lines that went throughout the Soviet Union. They had special procedures... and as the person who was sometimes left in charge after working hours, I knew all those... I knew that the HF line can be used to contact only the periphery, while Moscow was the forbidden zone. And I knew that Peters had this HF line, and I knew his number by heart... And then I was told: “If the situation requires it, you may make your phone call.” So I was permitted to use the special line.
Interviewer. Did Peters answer?
J. Vagris. Yes, he answered the phone, and he was quite surprised: “How did you manage to get through to me?” And then I told him everything what had happened... it’s hard to recall all the details, but...
Interviewer. What about Lukyanov? Which side was he backing?
J. Vagris. Lukyanov – he was...
Interviewer. He did not seem to be officially on the putschists’ side, did he?
J. Vagris. No, not officially.
Interviewer. But why did he try to slow down everything?
J. Vagris. Lukyanov was Gorbachev’s man. Not just 100% but 200% loyal. He was Gorbachev’s man through and through. I was convinced about that then, and I am still convinced – although there is no evidence – that Gorbachev knew about the Putsch.
Interviewer. But he had this position that you mentioned previously...
J. Vagris. Yes. “If it succeeds, I’ll support it.”
Interviewer. “If not, you’ll take the blame.”
J. Vagris. Yes, that was his position. And since Lukyanov was very well aware of it, he simply could not betray Gorbachev.
Interviewer. I see. All right, then. You said that you spent some time in the Kremlin. What do you think... the Putsch was rather poorly planned, wasn’t it?
J. Vagris. Generally speaking... it’s beyond my comprehension... It seemed to be orchestrated by kindergartners.
Interviewer. Well, yes, but... What was your impression of the people in the Kremlin? Weren’t they somewhat isolated from real life? Weren’t they living in their own little world?
J. Vagris. Totally!
Interviewer. Totally?
J. Vagris. Totally! You know, for approximately four years I was sometimes left in charge after working hours in there... and also before that, when I worked in the committees of the Supreme Council... We had committee meetings before the budget was approved each year... Talking about being double-faced, just as I said in the very beginning... I was one of the committee members... and we all were assigned a republic to analyse and to compile a report on how it had executed its budget and how things were going in that particular republic. I was assigned to report on Kazakhstan. When I was given all the relevant materials, a Presidium staff member approached me and very politely said to me: “Do you know that comrade Kunayev [First Secretary of Kazakhstan Communist Party] is a member of the Politburo? So save your criticism... You don’t have to dig deep. All the decisions will be taken at the Politburo, so he will take care of it on his own.” And when I started to examine the data from Kazakhstan, I saw that they were very poor. Non-performance, failures... Yet, we are talking about Kunayev. Therefore, I was told not to criticise the situation in Kazakhstan. I said to the staff member: “Then why are you giving me these papers?” He said: “Well, we have to have some understanding, you know.” This was a prime example of being double-faced – real life was one thing, while we tried to paint a completely different picture.
Interviewer. Also during the Putsch everybody in the Kremlin felt as if everything was O.K. and we will soon...
J. Vagris. Well, partially... There is this feeling in there because... When I was still sometimes left in charge there, well, for the last time... when there was the Union plenary session... When the situation was already changing... In the Kremlin... First they gave you the so-called “member carrier” – a black ZIM limo that could be driven wherever you wanted... Of course, everything was all right! So what if an old lady has some pressing issues or something on her mind... Well, there were some, let’s say, mentally unstable people who were raising panic. If you live in such an isolated world... When I was left in charge there, I did not live at the embassy residence... I did not live next to the Kremlin, on Granovsky Street, where I could have had a five-room apartment with a maid who cooked my meals, did my laundry and everything. I also was not entitled to go to a fancy summerhouse “Snegiri”, where one could go and...
Interviewer. You get the impression that the world around you is a fairy tale, and the state is flourishing.
J. Vagris. Yes. Well there was another example of absurdity. Gromiko, an expert in foreign affairs, was promoted to the post of... the interior... the president’s... I mean Chairman of the Presidium. And there was this meeting... Well, at one of the meetings they talked about... they analysed the results of reviewing the working people’s complaints. So we all delivered our reports... explained the situation and so on. It was all written in sand just to have the documentation stamped... And then it was Gromiko’s turn to take the floor. He had something written in front of him, and he said: “Well, I don’t understand. I don’t understand why more than 60% of the working people’s complaints received at the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR are about housing.” He said: “Because we all know that the housing issue in the Soviet Union was solved years ago...” This was his perspective... This was how he, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, saw the situation!
Interviewer. Well, as we approach the concluding part... What about the time when the USSR recognised the Republic of Latvia? How did it go? They had a special meeting for this, didn’t they?
J. Vagris. Yes, they held the last Congress, the last Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR. And then they... Well, they made the decision... We were there with our lawyers... Bišers and Plotnieks, members of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, also were there. And this last Presidium meeting was like a marketplace: people approached Gorbachev and gave him different papers...
Interviewer. And what about the voting, if any?
J. Vagris. There was a voting. I was there with Plotnieks... And I said: “Well, we should approach him as well!” So we approached him, and I said: “Mikhail Sergeyevich, here is our proposal... When you discuss these issues, please do not forget about Latvia!” “Yes!” he said. “In a couple of days we will have the committee meeting where the decision will be made. We won’t forget you!” he said. And that was it! And then they voted...
Interviewer. So the Congress voted...
J. Vagris. The Congress voted...
Interviewer. I doubt if there were any votes against. It seemed to be a clear victory, didn’t it?
J. Vagris. Yes, it was a clear victory... the Congress dissolved itself, and then they voted... And then the meeting was concluded, Gorbachev had already left the room with this other guy who was sitting there in the Presidium... And then the brawl began... Alksnis, another representative from Latvia, stood up and said: “Do you even understand what you have done here? It’s a coup, and it must be punished as a criminal offence! Therefore, all of you who supported it have to be punished!” Well, and so on... And that’s it. That was the last day when we were there. Then we went home... |