Saeima of the Republic of Latvia

Interviewer.

Did you have a premonition of the Putsch? Did anyone get any signals apart from the address by Bišers [member of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia] at the Presidium?

V. Dozorcev.

None. None whatsoever.

As for the address by Bišers, he only repeated what Popov [Mayor of Moscow] had said, or rather written, in a note to Matlock [former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union]. Why did he do that in writing? Obviously, he suspected that the American Embassy was bugged. It is also obvious why he went to the American Embassy – because Yeltsin was in the United States. He looked for a way to let Yeltsin know that something was about to happen. He was definitely worried about the fact that Yeltsin was left out of the process. How else could he let Yeltsin know if not through the diplomatic channels of the U.S.? This is why he went to Matlock. That’s all.

Interviewer.

It didn’t matter whom he met… Matlock, Baker, Bush, Yeltsin… All of them…

V. Dozorcev.

They knew perfectly well. I can tell you about a remarkable episode from the meeting between Baker [U.S. Secretary of State] and Meri [founding member of the Estonian Popular Front, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia]. Baker had apparently warned Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia that a coup could occur in July during the G8 meeting in London, to which Gorbachev was invited and which he could not miss. So the idea was to stage a coup while he was on that trip. Americans thought that the planned date was adapted to that meeting. Gorbachev went there as expected. He did not believe that. And so he went there. He did not believe even later…

So where were we? Meri asked Baker a question at that meeting: “In case of a coup, will you help us?” I am quoting him word for word. “In case of a coup, will you help us?” Baker said: “Yes, of course…” But when Meri tried discussing details of this assistance with him, Baker replied: “You misunderstood me. We are ready to help you personally, but that’s as far as it goes.”

Interviewer.

(Laughs.) One more thing… how and where did you find out about the Putsch?

V. Dozorcev.

I found out about it when I came from Bigauņciems to work, to my editorial office… we had already left the Publishing House. It was captured by OMON forces, Rubiks [member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia and Chairman of the State Committee for Emergency Situations] and the like. As for us, we had removed all the editorial teams except those working for Sovetskaya Latviya, Cīņa, Molodezhka [Sovetskaya molodezh], etc. The rest of us had left. I rented two rooms on Dzirnavu iela 59, where Molodezhka used to be, and that was where we printed our publications. I came to work having completely no clue. I drove the Jūrmala motorway and saw some armoured personnel carriers right on the motorway and even some tanks at the airport junction. I noticed all that. But we were used to frequent redeployments of military hardware. For example, when helicopters were hovering above the parliament and we phoned Kuzmin [Commander of the Baltic Military District] to ask about them, he used to tell us: “Manoeuvres are in progress” or “We are taking air samples”. It was nonsense. He was mocking us. Tanks and armoured personnel carriers moved regularly; it was none of our business where a military division was going. So on that day, I did not pay any attention to it. Even when I saw a few combat vehicles in front of the Publishing House, it didn’t alarm me.

I came to work and saw Popov, the former Colonel who was responsible for all releases of my magazine; he looked worried. I could see from his concerned look that he expected me to say something. But I still had no clue.

Then my younger son Maksim phoned from the parliament (I had given him a lift). It was his first official day at work at the Press Service of the parliament. He had been hanging around there for a long time, and that was his first day of employment there. So he phoned me shouting: “Do you know that Gorbachev is ousted… he is in Foros…?” Then, of course, I did connect the dots. That is how I found out about the Putsch.

It is hard to recall our feelings during that time. We knew one thing for sure: as always in times of danger, we must be in the parliament. The most important thing was not to leave the building of the parliament. So we all rushed to it. Furthermore, one could watch the little news that there was on the tellies there.

Interviewer.

CNN showed the news…

V. Dozorcev.

Exactly, CNN did … But here, endless Swan Lake was on and some other stuff…

I tell you, at some moments MPs had a sharper reaction than on 19 August. For example, on 15 May 1989, that is, 1990, after the adoption of the Declaration, when the parliament was besieged. They also reacted sharply during the Barricades in January. A few MPs couldn’t cope; they had to be taken to Aptechnaya Street [Psychiatry and Narcology Centre]… excuse me… to be diagnosed with…. One of them was running around and shouting that Saddam Hussein was pointing a missile at the Knighthood building [parliament] and so on… That is just an example of reactions back then. But as for this time, I wouldn’t say that MPs were worried or ran like rats… I wouldn’t say that. Later, it was learned that the police had taken care of themselves; they had vanished into thin air; Vaznis [Minister for the Interior of the Republic of Latvia] was not at his post. That was found out later.

There’s no point in recalling now who back then was in the parliament and who wasn’t. You know what I mean. No one had such concerns. And then this Putsch burst as a bubble… They were calming one another…

As for the situation at home… As I say, those days were difficult for my wife because she asked me only one thing: “Can it be arranged for Maksim to start his work at the Press Service later?” I said: “It’s too late. He already works there. His salary is already accumulating…” And that’s all.

Interviewer.

Tālavs Jundzis [member of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia] told us that the Supreme Council had not prepared for such an eventuality and wasn’t ready.

V. Dozorcev.

Not at all… I say… I don’t believe those who say that there was a feeling of naiveté. No one had any special premonitions. Not at all.

It’s all different from what we would have done if the Putsch had succeeded. It is as though many of those who experienced it sometimes try to recollect those events and think… I feel strange talking about it because it doesn’t matter what we would have done but rather what would have been done to us… (Laughs.)

Interviewer.

By the way, what would you have done?

V. Dozorcev.

I wouldn’t have fled. That’s for sure. Because I am a follower of the Pochvennichestvo [nativist movement].

Interviewer.

But what would you have done? What is the worst-case scenario if they had succeeded? Knowing the system, how severe would the repressions have been?

V. Dozorcev.

The myth about the list had already been dispelled by that time. I mean, the myth that Gorbunovs [Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia] had a list of a hundred people to be shot and sealed in concrete; that he had allegedly received it from the people of [Colonel] Goncharenko and Antyufeyev [deputy chief of criminal investigation of the Riga Police] and… the prosecutor… starting with D…

Interviewer.

Dzenītis.

V. Dozorcev.

No, not him…

Interviewer.

Daukšts.

V. Dozorcev.

Daukšts… [Allegedly] he had such a list… Many people ran to Gorbunovs to consult it.

Interviewer.

They looked for their names...

V. Dozorcev.

Right, in order to look for their names… That was after January. That myth disappeared quickly because he had no list whatsoever. It’s a load of rubbish. I talked to him many times. In various ways… It went like this: “Come on, you’ve got to have it somewhere… you must have made a copy.” There was no list.

Next thing. We thought the repressions might go like this: they would definitely isolate the ruling elite… selectively… That would mean that heads of committees would get hurt. But I think they wouldn’t have touched all the MPs. It was already the time when people were seldom sent to jail for their beliefs. Even never.

One can say that everybody counted on collective responsibility… (Laughs.) So… I wouldn’t say that anybody had a harsh reaction during those days. I didn’t see it in anybody at all.

Besides, it all happened so fast that we didn’t have time to look around. I phoned already in the evening of 20 [August], or rather 19 [August], the connection was not interrupted by the way, so I phoned to Moscow without any problems. I could speak freely. I spoke to Yakovlev [co-founder of the Movement for Democratic Reform], Stankevich [supporter of Yeltsin] and someone else about the situation over there. It was close to a battle, by the way. Yeltsin was already giving some speeches in the safety of his bulletproof vest. And everything was fine.

So it wasn’t as in January.

Interviewer.

The role of Gorbachev in all this… Not in the Putsch but in the Putsch being against him… Let’s say, Boldin [active supporter of the Putsch], Baklanov [member of the State Committee on the State of Emergency] and Lukyanov [Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR] claim that taking into account the state of emergency and tensions between Yeltsin and Gorbachev… the list of the State Committee on the State of Emergency… And Gorbachev saw it, and some action had been taken in accordance with his…

V. Dozorcev.

I can see two questions here that are sometimes discussed, and I have been asked to comment on them.

The first one is whether the Putsch opposed Gorbachev. The second one is whether Gorbachev knew about it. Vaznis writes that he allegedly knew that the intent was as follows: if it succeeds, then everything is fine; if it fails, then I have nothing to do with it. In my opinion, a single fact provides an answer to both of these questions. As we know, the dismissal of Gorbachev had already been announced. It was not based on his opinions or inaction… Nothing like that; the justification was that he was unable to perform his duties for health reasons. Tell me, please, if the whole thing had failed or succeeded, what would Gorbachev have gained? Could he have gained in general? If [the Putsch] had succeeded, who would have needed him? It would mean that he should have recovered quickly and resumed his duties, wouldn’t it? And if [the Putsch] had failed, it would have been even worse for him. That would have been the end.

Interviewer.

And that’s the way it turned out.

V. Dozorcev.

Yes, that’s the way it turned out. Gorbachev stood no chance in either case. And this fact alone convinces me that the State Committee on the State of Emergency fought the wrong enemy. Instead of Gorbachev, they had to tackle Yeltsin, who was rising as a potential figure under conditions of near diarchy in the Soviet Union. Therefore, I’m completely sure that the plot was against Gorbachev. I’m also convinced that Gorbachev was not the kind of person to discuss those problems on the level of the police jargon used by Mr. Vaznis. That’s not the way it is. That’s the cop-shop style of reasoning: “if it fails, I have nothing to do with it.”

In a thing like a coup, thousands of people get involved. It cannot be contained. Gorbachev might have heard something but he had hopes; that is why he reacted neither in July in London at the G8 nor here when it all happened. Bessmertnykh [Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR] or someone else had allegedly warned him. The thing is, with regard to possible coup attempts, he, like any head of state, had a permanent arrangement with two people. First, with the person who has control of the army and is subordinated to him, the commander in chief of the armed forces… He has full control of all the ministers, he appoints the kind of minister who is incapable of a coup. That is first and foremost. And second, [he had an arrangement] with the Minister for the Interior. So, these two ministries.

As for Pugo [Minister for the Interior of the USSR], Gorbachev had no reason to suspect him. In contrast to that old Areopagus, Pugo was a new man in Moscow, and unlike them he had quite democratic opinions. Gorbachev didn’t expect such disloyalty from Pugo.

Interviewer.

The putschists later expressed regret that Gromov, who had seemingly been absolutely loyal, later switched sides.

V. Dozorcev.

And who didn’t switch sides? The commander of one of the main districts, the Saint Petersburg district, or rather the Leningrad district? And the Urals district? They received only six… That was a very ill-prepared thing. And, of course, it was turned against Gorbachev.

Interviewer.

Then I have another question. Why did it succeed in 1964 but not in 1991?

V. Dozorcev.

Why did they manage to oust Khrushchev?

Interviewer.

Well… yes… It was not exactly a coup…

V. Dozorcev.

Because one has to show gratitude to those who brought one to power, and he didn’t. That’s all. He breached some internal code in relations with the decision makers. If he had had better relations with Zhukov [Marshal of the USSR], that probably would not have happened.

Interviewer.

Tell me about the second time you met with Yeltsin. You were in that small delegation from Latvia headed by Gorbunovs that went to obtain the statement from Yeltsin…

V. Dozorcev.

…on the recognition.

Interviewer.

Yes...

V. Dozorcev.

Well, I had a rough idea of what had preceded that because it is well known that Jurkāns, Minister for Foreign Affairs [of the Republic of Latvia], was abroad, where we had sent him. I don’t know how that decision was taken. Maybe in the same way as in the Barricades in January. So a decision was taken with regard to him and Īvāns [Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia and journalist]. He phoned Peters [member of the Supreme Council of the USSR from Latvia and poet] from there, and they both discussed how good it would be if Russia were among the first countries to announce the recognition. After that, Peters talked to Kozyrev [later, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia]. I don’t remember if Jurkāns himself spoke to Kozyrev. I met Kozyrev to discuss the same subject, but somehow we didn’t touch upon this issue. Anyway, Yeltsin understood that this was a good occasion to apologise for the harm that Russia as a superpower had done to the Baltic States… and it would be a handsome gesture. By that time, only Iceland had announced it would consider the recognition. Thus, Iceland had merely promised, but Russia was the first one to do it. That chance shouldn’t have been missed.

I knew it all. The thing is that starting from approximately the Barricades in January, I helped Gorbunovs from time to time to draft various appeals, addresses to the army in order to dissuade them from using arms, addresses to the Russian-speaking community and so on… I sometimes edited his documents that he wrote on his own. So we were in contact concerning these matters. But I never thought I would get on that delegation. I wasn’t particularly eager for that either. He just phoned me one day and said I had to go.

Interviewer.

Did they take you as a representative of ethnic Russians?

V. Dozorcev.

Probably that was one of the reasons. This meeting with Yeltsin was very strange. To begin with, he was extremely excited after having just prevailed over the Putsch. He was saying: “I’ve just taken off my bulletproof vest.” And he told us about these events in the same manner that Russians use to tell about an action movie among friends… “He gives him a bang on the head, and he hits him in the ear…” Something like that. It was shocking to hear this in his office, and I saw how it made the refined Kozyrev shudder. But he had nothing to do. It made us all shudder a little bit as well. Because we are from the Baltic States, and our Russians are different… and the Latvians who were present there, they are reserved. So it was strange to see such high spirits right in the office.

But then he said: “Let’s talk business.” He pulled out his beautiful pen that he later gave as a present to Gorbunovs.

Some time before signing the statement, he asked what problems we had. We had only two problems which we came to discuss and about which we spoke. Gorbunovs spoke, I spoke. He didn’t remember who I was; he just remembered that we had met somewhere… So many developments… So what problems did we have? We asked him to quickly tackle two issues: to remove Kuzmin and withdraw the OMON troops. I was amazed at the way these issues were resolved. Everything was decided straight away by phone calls directly from his office.

Vaznis was wrong in saying that Shaposhnikov [commander in chief of the air force of the USSR] removed somebody after meeting with Gorbunovs… Gorbunovs did not meet with Marshal Shaposhnikov. Everything happened in our presence in Yeltsin’s office. He phoned to Leningrad, asked for the commander of the district and talked to him like this: “Hey, listen, I’ve got Gorbunovs sitting in front of me”. I’m quoting him word for word; he spoke just like people in the street: “Hey, listen, I’ve got Gorbunovs sitting in front of me with his delegation. Tomorrow morning he goes to Riga by train. Now you take a military plane and go to Riga, and you take over the district and meet Gorbunovs as commander of the district. Do you understand? Got that? Get going!”

As for the OMON troops, he said: “We’ll deal with that!” He talked to Bakatin [Chairman of the KGB] and said that this issue would be dealt with, but carefully. Because it is an armed group, and one has to exercise caution. “The new commander of the district will receive an order to deal with that. The formation will be disarmed and redeployed somewhere deep inside Russia. And that is where we will deal with it.”

That’s what he said. And that was it. Both our problems were addressed. All the other issues were solved even more easily, approximately like this: “All right. Deal? No showdown. You get what’s in your territory, we get what’s in ours. No showdown. Only leave my spa intact.”

And that was all. We did leave the spa intact, as you know. It’s still there.

Interviewer

Listen, he asked. you whether Russians would be treated badly…

V. Dozorcev.

Well, he didn’t ask me… He started speaking; he resumed his political role… He spoke to Gorbunovs and to all of us: “All right, so this idea of independence. I understand how ethnic Latvians take it, but how do ethnic Russians take it?” Instead of replying, Gorbunovs referred to me; he actually set me up. He said: “Here’s a Russian-speaking writer, let him have the floor!” And I told him that I have only the results of the public survey conducted on 3 March. It wasn’t a referendum, as many mistakenly call it now, but it was a legally non-binding survey. But we can take those figures into account. I gave him all the figures and said that those results indicated that the majority, at least more than a half, of the Baltic Russians, of non-Latvians, support the idea of the independence as such. Therefore… And he replied: “Hey, don’t treat your Russians badly; you have plenty of them!” That’s what he said. Those were the last words in this regard. After that he signed [the statement].